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I. INTRODUCTION
The September 11 attacks on the United States and the rising threat of 
terrorism in the EU Member States have contributed to the development of 
various surveillance solutions as an attempt to ensure a high level of security 
and prevent another 9/11. Rather than focusing on the detection of past acts, 
governments are now focusing on the pre-emption of future terrorist attacks.1 
The logic of pre-emption in the counter-terrorism strategy is best summarized 
by a famous statement of the former US President George W. Bush: ‘if we 
wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long’.2 In other 
words, ‘authorities can punish or intervene pre-emptively because they (think 
they) know the future and believe their prediction is always true’.3 Therefore, 
pre-emptive surveillance does not start with a suspicion against a particular 
person or persons. It has a proactive element, aimed at identifying a danger 
rather than identifying a known threat. The pre-emptive approach to security 
threats that concentrates on prediction requires ‘new imaginative technolo-
gies […] to be deployed in order to detect and disrupt possible plots at the 
earliest stage’.4 Data surveillance is one of them. 
Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, expressed 
the view that ‘terrorist attacks that have struck at the heart of our Union in 
recent years and the ever evolving nature of organized crime have brought 
into sharp focus the need to improve cooperation on internal security issues 
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1 Mitsilegas (2016): 2.
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3 Van Brakel (2016): 191.
4 De Goede (2008): 162.
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and build an effective Security Union. […] We must ensure that we deny ter-
rorists the means and space to plan, finance and carry out attacks’.5 From 
2000 to 2018, 753 people were killed in terrorist attacks in the EU.6 As Eu-
ropol indicates, the threat to EU citizens from jihadist attacks either perpe-
trated or inspired by Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda and their affiliates re-
mains high.7 At the same time, security agencies point out that in recent years 
the modus operandi of terrorist organizations has changed, including target 
selection, choice of weapons, and the means of attack.8 All of this poses a num-
ber of challenges for the EU and its Member States. Faced with the threat of 
possible nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional attacks in the Union, 
and bearing the responsibility for pre-empting those attacks by ‘connecting 
the dots’,9 for security purposes the EU has decided to enhance the collection 
and exchange of personal data in order to generate useful and reliable corre-
lations and ultimately to identify suspects. Personal data are perceived as one 
of the major assets in the fight against terrorism and transnational organized 
crime. As a result, the EU has adopted a pre-emptive data surveillance pol-
icy to monitor actual and potential risks and their sources through the PNR 
system. The Passenger Name Record (PNR)10 is flight information provided 
by passengers while booking tickets and checking in. The PNR is collected by 
air carriers for their own commercial purposes and includes different types of 
information, such as travel dates, travel itinerary, date of birth, ticket infor-
mation, passport details, contact details (address, e-mail, telephone number), 
the travel agent at which the flight was booked, the means of payment, and 
the seat number and baggage information. At the same time, the PNR may 
reveal sensitive data relating to one’s religion or ethnic origin (a passenger’s 
meal preferences) or health (medical assistance required by the passenger).
The present article aims to examine how the mass processing of PNR data 
under the PNR Directive affects innocent individuals. The first part outlines 
the background of the EU PNR system. The second part briefly explores the 
processing of the PNR data. The third part analyses the PNR directive as 
a tool for profiling passengers. The final part summarizes the article and 
draws some provisional conclusions.
 5 Ursula von der Leyen, Mission letter for Ylva Johansson, Commissioner-designate for 
Home Affairs, Brussels, 10 September 2019: 5, available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf> [accessed: 10 January 2021].
 6 M. Pagazaurtundua-Ruiz, White and Black Book of Terrorism, available at: <https://eu-
ropediplomatic.com/2019/03/04/black-white-paper-on-terrorism-victims/> [accessed: 10 January 
2021].
 7 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
the EU Security Union Strategy, COM (2020)605 final, 24 July 2020: 4. See also Europol, European 
Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 2020.
 8 Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, The European Union’s 
Policies on Counter-Terrorism. Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness, 2017: 39–40.
 9 Connecting the dots ‘has become a metaphor for discovering the “big picture” from seem-
ingly unrelated facts’. See Taipale (2003–2004): 3.
10 The Passenger Name Record is a generic name given to the files created by airlines for 
each flight any passenger books.
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II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE EU PNR LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Originally PNR data were introduced by the U.S. government in the after-
math of September 11, 2001 as a useful tool to identify people who may pose 
a terrorist threat.11 The United States began assigning risk assessment rat-
ings to all individuals entering or leaving the country.12 It is worth mentioning 
that nine out of the nineteen hijackers of the 9/11 attacks had been identified 
as flight risks by the airport security, but were nevertheless allowed to board 
their planes13. 
Michael Chertoff, the former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, ex-
plained that ‘PNR data [...] is critical for law enforcement authorities and im-
migration authorities to detect people who should not be allowed to enter the 
country or who pose a risk to others [...]. Without this data, in effect, we’re with-
out our radar. We have no way of determining in advance who is coming into 
this country’.14 In November 2001, believing that the processing of PNR data 
could contribute to keeping terrorists out of the United States, the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act was adopted, which obliged air carriers operating 
flights to and from the United States to provide the U.S. Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with 
electronic access to data contained in their automated booking and departure 
control systems, called Passenger Name Record (PNR)15. Imposing this obliga-
tion on airlines flying from the EU has raised doubts regarding the compliance 
of the US PNR law with the EU data protection and privacy law. It turned out 
that PNR data belong to ‘personal data’ under the EU data protection law, as 
they refer to ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person’.16 As a result, the U.S. authorities put European air carriers in an awk-
ward position, since, on the one hand, their regulations violated the EU data 
protection and privacy law. On the other hand, European airlines were liable to 
sanctions under the U.S. law if they followed the EU law.17 
The United States and the European Union resolved that conflict by sign-
ing the first PNR agreement on 28 May 200418. Nevertheless, two years later 
11 Lowe (2017): 80. See also Casagran (2015); Kaunert, Leonard, McKenzie (2012): 483; 
De Hert, Papakonstantinou (2010a): 369.
12 Rizer (2010): 77.
13 Tzanou (2017a): 108; Dummer (2006): 584. 
14 Rasmussen (2008): 583.
15 Kaunert, Leonard, McKenzie (2012): 483.
16 Article 2 of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data. However, this Directive is no longer in force. Currently 
it is Article 4 item 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protec-
tion Regulation).
17 Tzanou (2015b): 88. See also De Hert, Schutter (2008): 322.
18 Council Decision 2004/496/EC of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion of an Agreement between 
the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of 
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the agreement was annulled by the European Court of Justice, as it was based 
upon a flawed legal basis19. Following the Court’s judgment, on 3 July 2006 
the Council and the Commission notified the US Government that the said 
Agreement had to be terminated with effect from 30 September 2006. Bear-
ing in mind the tight deadline, the conclusion of the new PNR agreement be-
fore September 2006 seemed unrealistic. Thus, the EU concluded an Interim 
Agreement20 until a new PNR Agreement with the US was signed on 23 July 
2007.21 The fourth and last agreement for the processing of PNR data between 
the EU and the US, which is still in force today, entered into force on 1 June 
2012.22 Meanwhile, the EU was challenged by similar requests from other 
third countries, such as Canada,23 Australia24 and Japan25. 
Ultimately, in the Stockholm Programme the European Commission was 
called upon to introduce an EU PNR system.26 In 2011 a proposal for a Direc-
tive on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime was sub-
mitted. However, the European Parliament, having regard to the opinions of 
the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Data Protection 
Supervisor and the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, rejected the propos-
PNR data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection, OJ 2004 L 183/ 83 and corrigendum at OJ 2005 L 255/168. The 
Council’s decision was based on the Commission Decision 2004/535/EC of 14 May 2004 on the 
adequate protection of personal data contained in the Passenger Name Record of air passengers 
transferred to the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, OJ 2004 L 235/11.
19 Judgment of the CJEU of 30 May 2006, European Parliament v Council of the European 
Union (C-317/04) and Commission of the European Communities (C-318/04).
20 Council Decision 2006/729/CFSP/JHA of 16 October 2006 on the signing, on behalf of the 
European Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America 
on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United 
States Department of Homeland Security, OJ L 298 of 27 October 2006.
21 Council Decision 2007/551/CFSP/JHA of 23 July 2007 on the signing, on behalf of the Eu-
ropean Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America 
on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United 
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement), OJ L 204 of 4 August 
2007.
22 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and 
transfer of passenger name records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, OJ 
L 215 of 11 August 2012.
23 On 26 July 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union issued an opinion which 
stated that the draft agreement between the EU and Canada on the transfer of PNR data may 
not be concluded in its current form, since several provisions of the draft agreement did not meet 
the requirements stemming from the fundamental rights of the EU. However, the negotiations 
for a revision of the envisaged PNR agreement with Canada have been concluded and are pend-
ing finalization.
24 Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs and Border Protec-
tion Service, OJ L 186 of 14 July 2012.
25 In February 2020, the Council adopted a decision authorizing the opening of negotiations 
between the EU and Japan for a PNR agreement.
26 European Council, The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and 
Protecting Citizens, 2010, OJ C 115/01: 19.
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al in April 2013. The Commission and the European Parliament reactivated 
the negotiations for an EU PNR Directive after the terrorist attack on the 
editorial office of Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015 and the further acts 
of violence which took place in this city in November 2015. Bearing in mind 
that an estimated 5,000 Europeans have joined terrorist organizations in 
Iraq and Syria and returning foreign fighters  have posed a threat to security, 
the Council recalled the urgency and importance it attaches to the European 
PNR directive. In December 2015 the European Parliament and the Council 
reached a compromise on Directive (EU) 2016/681 on the use of passenger 
name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and pros-
ecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.27 In doing so, the European 
legislator was faced with the need to strike a proper balance between the fight 
against terrorism and serious crime on the one hand and protecting personal 
data and respecting the private life of the passengers on the other.
The PNR Directive is based on Article 87(2)(a) and Article 82(1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The essential objective of 
the PNR Directive is to ‘ensure security, to protect the life and safety of per-
sons, and to create a legal framework for the protection of PNR data with re-
gard to their processing by competent authorities’.28 This is to be accomplished 
through an assessment of PNR data leading to identify ‘unknown’ persons, 
namely persons previously unsuspected of involvement in serious crime and 
terrorism, but whom an analysis of the data suggests may be involved in such 
crime, and who should therefore be subject to further examination by the com-
petent authorities29.
III. PROCESSING OF THE PNR DATA UNDER DIRECTIVE 2016/681
The PNR Directive aims to harmonize Member States’ provisions on the 
obligations for air carriers to transfer the PNR data of passengers on ex-
tra-flights30 and the processing of those data, including their collection, use, 
and retention by the Member States, as well as their exchange between them31. 
Member States are obliged to ensure that air carriers transmit PNR data us-
27 Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016 (hereinafter: ‘PNR Direc-
tive’, ‘Directive’, ‘Directive 2016/681’). The Directive was adopted by the 28 EU Member States on 
27 April 2016 and came into effect on 28 May 2018. See also First Report from the Commission 
to the European Parliament and the Council on the review of Directive 2016/681 on the use of 
passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
terrorist offences and serious crime, COM(2020)305 final.
28 See Recital 5 Directive 2016/681
29 See Recital 7 Directive 2016/681.
30 It should be mentioned that Directive 2016/681 leaves Member States with the option of 
an additional opt-in to obtain passenger data from intra-EU flights, Article 2(1).
31 Article 1(1) Directive 2016/681.
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ing the ‘push method’, which means transferring data into the database of the 
authority requesting them. 
PNR data32 should only contain details of passengers’ reservations and 
travel itineraries that enable the competent authorities to identify air passen-
gers representing a threat to internal security.33 The Directive stipulates that 
nineteen categories of PNR data must be transmitted.34 Simultaneously, PNR 
data cannot include a person’s race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, political 
or any other opinion, trade union membership, health, sexual life or sexual 
orientation.35 
PNR data may be processed only for the purposes of preventing, detecting, 
investigating and prosecuting terrorist offences and serious crime.36 The defi-
nition of terrorist offences applied in this Directive should be the same as in 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA. In turn, the definition of serious 
crime37 should encompass the categories of offence listed in Annex II to this 
Directive. Air carriers are obliged to transfer the PNR data of all passengers 
to the Passenger Information Unit (PIU) established at the domestic level 
by the Member States.38 PIUs are responsible for collecting PNR data from 
air carriers, storing, processing and transferring those data to the competent 
national law enforcement authorities, and for exchanging both PNR data and 
the result of processing those data with the PIUs of other Member States and 
with Europol.39 PNR data are processed by the PIU’s for three purposes: first-
ly, to carry out an assessment of passengers prior to their scheduled arrival in 
or departure from the Member State to identify persons who require further 
examination; secondly, to respond to a request based on sufficient grounds 
from the competent authorities to provide and process PNR data in specific 
cases; and thirdly, to analyse PNR data for the purpose of updating or creating 
new criteria to be used in the passenger assessment in order to identify any 
persons who may be involved in a terrorist offence or serious crime.40 When 
carrying out the passenger assessment, PIUs may compare PNR data against 
databases relevant for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating 
and prosecuting terrorist offences and serious crime, including databases on 
persons or objects sought or under alert, or process these data against ‘pre- 
32 According to Article 3(5) Directive 2016/681 PNR data ‘means a record of each passenger’s 
travel requirements which contains information necessary to enable reservations to be processed 
and controlled by the booking and participating air carriers for each journey booked by or on 
behalf of any person, whether it is contained in reservation systems, departure control systems 
used to check passengers onto flights, or equivalent systems providing the same functionalities.’
33 Recital 15 and Article 3(5) Directive 2016/681.
34 Annex 1 Directive 2016/681.
35 Recital 15 Directive 2016/681.
36 Article 1(2) Directive 2016/681.
37 Serious crime refers to crimes punishable by a custodial sentence or a detention order for 
a maximum period of at least three years under the national law of a Member State.
38 Article 4(1) Directive 2016/681.
39 Article 4(2) Directive 2016/681.
40 Article 6(2) Directive 2016/681.
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determined criteria’.41 Nevertheless, the Directive indicates that the assess-
ment of passengers must be carried out in a non-discriminatory manner and 
these pre-determined criteria must be targeted, proportionate and specific. 
The criteria cannot be based on a person’s sensitive data, including race or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religion or philosophical beliefs, trade union 
membership, health, sexual life or sexual orientation.42 Simultaneously, the 
Directive specifies that Member States shall ensure that any positive match 
resulting from the automated processing of PNR data is individually reviewed 
by non-automated means to verify whether the competent authority needs to 
take action under the national law.43
IV. PNR DATA AND PROFILING
PNR data provide a detailed picture of the journey and the passenger. In 
order to prevent and detect serious crime, including acts of terrorism, the Eu-
ropean Commission indicated that PNR data can be used by law enforcement 
authorities in three different ways: reactively, in real-time and proactively44. 
The ‘re-active’ use refers to the use of data in investigations, prosecutions 
and the unravelling of networks after a crime has been committed.45 The ‘re-
al-time’ use means that PNR data are used prior to the arrival or departure of 
passengers in order to prevent a crime, watch or arrest persons before a crime 
has been committed, or because a crime has been or is being committed.46 The 
Commission specifies that in such cases PNR data are necessary for running 
against pre-determined assessment criteria in order to identify previously ‘un-
known’ suspects and for running against various databases of persons.47 The 
‘proactive’ use refers to the use of PNR data for the analysis and creation of as-
sessment criteria, which can then be used for a pre-arrival and pre-departure 
assessment of passengers48. Therefore, ‘PNR data are used to create patterns 
(future) which will be subsequently used to identify “unknown” suspects (pres-
ent), which in their turn may generate further patterns [...]’.49 For example, 
the use of PNR data, by comparing PNR data against various databases on 
persons and objects sought, enables gathering evidence and, where relevant, 
detecting offenders of specific crimes and unravelling criminal networks. It 
should be noticed that even PNR data from a few years ago, inter alia, such 
41 Article 6(3) Directive 2016/681.
42 Article 6(4) Directive 2016/681.
43 Article 6(5) Directive 2016/681.
44 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the use of Pas-
senger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 





49 Tzanou (2017a): 109–110.
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as addresses, telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and frequent flyer infor-
mation can have a significant meaning for finding links between persons who 
are suspected of conducting terrorist activity or organized crime (e.g. human 
trafficking, drug trafficking). Hence, effective use of PNR data, for example 
by comparing PNR data against various databases on persons and objects 
sought, is necessary to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute terrorist of-
fences and serious crime, and thus enhance internal security. The Court of 
Justice has corroborated that the fight against terrorism in order to maintain 
international peace and to ensure security constitutes an objective of general 
interest recognized by the EU. Examining the draft agreement between Can-
ada and the European Union on the transfer and processing of PNR data, the 
Court of Justice recognized that ‘processing of [PNR] data may be regarded 
as being appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that the objective relating to 
the protection of public security and safety [...]’.50 It should be stressed that 
the CJEU has accepted that the transfer, retention and use of PNR data can 
be a useful tool in the fight against terrorism, but only if strict and precise 
requirements are respected.
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that ‘the PNR data transfers estab-
lish a system of mass, generalized surveillance of all passengers, citizens and 
foreigners alike’.51 Regardless of whether individuals are aware of being tar-
gets of mass surveillance, the blanket collection of data has important ram-
ifications with regard to the rule of law and fundamental rights.52 It should 
be indicated that the PNR Directive affects all passengers who arrive in the 
territory of one Member State flying from a third country or flying from the 
territory of a Member State and depart in a third country, including in both 
cases flights with any stop-overs in the territory of Member States or third 
countries. It applies to all travellers, not merely those that have been identi-
fied as potentially ‘risky’ or even ‘guilty’. Thereby, the PNR Directive applies 
to a large population of passengers irrespective of the country they come from, 
shifting the focus of risk from suspect individuals and individual groups to 
‘a suspect population’.53 As Paul De Hert and Vagelis Papakonstantinou ob-
serve, ‘each one is presumed a criminal suspect unless his or her profile hints 
at the opposite’.54 
In essence, the assessment of every passenger prior to their scheduled 
arrival in or departure from the Member State on the basis of pre-determined 
criteria entails profiling. Profiling can generally mean ‘an automatic data pro-
cessing technique that consists of applying a “profile” to an individual, par-
ticularly in order to take decisions concerning her or him or for analysing or 
50 Opinion 1/15 of the CJEU of 26 July 2017.
51 Mitsilegas, Vavoula (2017): 244.
52 It is worth mentioning that on 31 October 2019 Belgian Constitutional Court referred ten 
preliminary questions to the CJEU concerning the obligation to transfer passenger information 
(C-817/19). In turn, on 20 January 2020 the District Court of Cologne submitted to the CJEU 
a preliminary question on whether the PNR Directive violated the fundamental rights. 
53 Vavoula (2017): 238. See also Rubinstein, Lee, Schwartz (2008); Rasmussen (2008).
54 De Hert, Papakonstantinou (2015b): 163.
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predicting her or his personal preferences, behaviours and attitudes’.55 The 
idea of profiling is not new. However, ‘the new pre-emptive surveillance tech-
nique [...] is based on inductive profiling [...] [which focuses on] clustering data 
in such way that information is inferred and predictions or expectations can 
be proposed’.56 ‘The profiles obtained are patterns that are the result of prob-
abilistic processing of data’.57 Then, intelligence and law enforcement author-
ities search ‘databases containing transactional and personal information for 
“hits” that indicate a match between the model and patterns left by potential 
evidence of terrorist plans or by potentially culpable individuals’.58 The funda-
mental difference in comparison with traditional criminal profiling is that ‘the 
decision-making is done by machines and not humans, and [it] becoming diffi-
cult to trace back where certain motivations behind the decisions come from’.59 
The main use of PNR data and ‘their alleged added value is found exact-
ly in the pattern-based analysis that can be performed on this set of data’.60 
Consequently, when a predefined profile is found in a database, the matching 
passenger will be further examined.61 Thus, the PNR Directive provides na-
tional authorities with a legal instrument that allows them, on the basis of the 
analysis of PNR data, to apply methods relating to the identification of pas-
sengers who have not been known to the law enforcement services, on the ba-
sis of patterns of behaviour of ‘risk’ or presenting a ‘high-risk’. However, none 
of these methods have been defined in Directive 2016/681 and, in fact, seem 
to be entirely within the discretion of the Member States. What is more, the 
PIU may process PNR data against pre-determined criteria and compare PNR 
data against relevant databases. It should be noted that the Directive does 
not comprise any specific provisions that refer to the principles and methods 
of setting up these databases. Nor is it explained which specific assessment 
criteria have to be applied. How these criteria have to be determined is left to 
the Member States, which may raise serious doubts as to whether the Direc-
tive actually establishes a legal framework providing for uniform guarantees 
and safeguards for the protection of PNR data for all EU citizens. Since the 
Directive does not lay down precise provisions that clarify how the processing 
of PNR data will be performed, passengers cannot predict the full impact of 
this regulation on their lives. 
It should be highlighted that pattern-based searching depends on the pow-
er of the statistical model which is used to detect suspicious individuals62. As 
a result, ‘this approach may intrude in known and unknown ways into the lives 
55 Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)13 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the 
protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data in the context of 
profiling, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 23 November 2010 at the 1099th meeting of 
the Ministers’ Deputies.
56 Van Brakel, De Hert (2011): 173.
57 Van Brakel, De Hert (2011): 173.
58 Rubinstein, Lee, Schwartz (2008): 263.
59 Van Brakel, De Hert (2011): 173.
60 Tzanou (2017a): 175.
61 Leese (2014): 501.
62 Rubinstein, Lee, Schwartz (2008): 263.
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of innocent people’.63 Some scholars have criticized this approach. It is worth 
quoting J. Dempsey and L. Flint, who present the view that pattern-based 
searches raise concerns with ‘the constitutional presumption of innocence and 
the Fourth Amendment principle that the government must have individual 
suspicion before it can conduct a search’.64 In turn, Rosamunde Van Brakel 
and Paul De Hert state that passenger profiling leads to ‘social sorting: they 
 sort people into categories assigning worth or risk’.65 As a result, religious 
minority such as Muslim people are much more vulnerable to thorough checks 
and greater scrutiny, before they can get on a plane, as they are perceived as 
more suspicious than other passengers.66 Finally, there is a danger of false 
positives. A false positive refers to innocent individuals that are wrongly iden-
tified by the algorithm. It is possible to find out profiles that provide valuable 
insights to law enforcement authorities about suspected individuals, but (at 
the same time) it is also inevitable that while using profiles the authorities 
will misinterpret the results and come to wrong conclusions about individu-
als. Inaccurate profiling can lead to an innocent passenger being blacklisted, 
investigated, humiliated or detained.67 Therefore, the question remains of how 
to verify the risks inherent in these profiles regarding ‘false positives’ or the 
discriminatory and abusive effect of them on certain groups in society.68
It is true, as has already been mentioned, that Directive 2016/681 specifies 
that the assessment of passengers must be carried out in a non-discrimina-
tory manner and that these pre-determined criteria must be targeted, pro-
portionate and specific. Nevertheless, like the criteria, this provision should 
also cover the databases against which PNR data are compared to prevent 
these databases from being based on a person’s race or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religion or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, health, 
sexual life or sexual orientation. According to the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, applying databases and assessment criteria should 
above all make it possible to obtain results which would be focused on the 
person with regard to whom there exists a reasonable suspicion of them being 
involved in a serious crime or terrorist activity, in other words, there are fac-
tual indications for suspecting that person of planning, committing or having 
committed a terrorist offence or serious crime.69 In Digital Rights, the Court 
of Justice of the EU stated that the determination of the period of retention 
must be based on objective criteria in order to ensure that it is limited to what 
is strictly necessary.70 Furthermore, in Opinion 1/15 the CJEU specified that 
63 Rubinstein, Lee, Schwartz (2008): 263. 
64 Dempsey, Flint (2004): 1466.
65 Van Brakel, De Hert (2011): 176.
66 Van Brakel, De Hert (2011): 176.
67 Rubinstein, Lee, Schwartz (2008): 263. See also Leese (2014): 496 and 499.
68 Tzanou (2017a): 177.
69 Judgment of the ECtHR of 4 December 2015, Application no. 47143/06, Zakharov v. Rus-
sia: para. 260.
70 Judgment of 8 April 2014 of the CJEU, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Commu-
nications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, 
Joined Cases No. C-293/12 and C-594/12: para. 64.
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provisions concerning retention of PNR data have to satisfy objective criteria 
that establish a connection between the personal data to be retained and the 
objective pursued. In the Court’s view ‘the retention of [PNR] data after the 
air passengers’ departure must be limited to that of passengers in respect of 
whom there is objective evidence from which it may be inferred that they may 
present a risk in terms of the fight against terrorism and serious transnation-
al crime’.71 The PNR Directive does not stipulate objective reasons that would 
justify the necessity of retaining all PNR data for five years.72 Since a vast 
number of persons are affected, additional criteria to limit the scope of target-
ed passengers must be added to Directive 2016/681. 
V. CONCLUSION
9/11 has given way to pre-emptive forms of surveillance, leading to gath-
ering, retaining and analysing a vast amount of personal data of millions of 
people on an unprecedented scale in order to investigate a person who has yet 
to commit a crime, and to determine their guilt with regard to a future crime 
based on past events. Pre-emptive surveillance assumes that everyone is un-
trustworthy. 
Using PNR data, the individual is profiled and encoded in terms of de-
grees of risk. The transfer of the specified personal data of air passengers, as 
well as their retention, aims to allow for the comparison of the data against 
pre-determined criteria or databases in order to identify persons previously 
unknown to law enforcement authorities. Nevertheless, the analysis of such 
a huge amount of data can easily lead to the entry of false data, which are 
then hard to correct. Although, the PNR Directive provides that any positive 
match resulting from the automated processing of PNR data requires human 
review, it is an illusory safeguard. To be clear ‘data-driven profiling in security 
screening relies on the assumption that all revealed patterns must necessar-
ily be scrutinized in order to ascertain whether they pose an actual threat. 
But, as the output of neural networks is most likely only machine readable, 
the human operator must act on the basis of the translation of algorithmic 
terms into risk levels’.73 In fact, ‘the human reviewers lose true agency, as 
they only enact what algorithmic categorizations indicate’.74 When algorithms 
increasingly dictate the decisions of law enforcement authorities regarding, 
for instance, placing a passenger on a terrorist ‘risk’ or ‘high-risk’ list, the data 
subject – the individual included in profile-based selections – is less able to 
question those outcomes.
Furthermore, the provisions on these pre-determined criteria and data-
bases, as well as the retention of PNR data for a period of five years, do not 
71 Opinion 1/15 of the CJEU of 26 July 2017.
72 Article 12(1) Directive 2016/681.
73 Leese (2014): 505.
74 Leese (2014): 505.
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meet the necessity requirement for interference under the principle of pro-
portionality. These provisions do not make any distinction based on the pas-
sengers concerned and therefore allow the retention of the PNR data of all air 
passengers. In other words, the legislator has not limited PNR data in a clear 
and precise way to what is strictly necessary according to the European data 
protection standard. 
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LEGITIMIZING PRE-EMPTIVE DATA SURVEILLANCE UNDER EU LAW: 
THE CASE OF THE PNR DIRECTIVE
S u m m a r y
The paper analyses the PNR Directive as pre-emptive data surveillance practice. The 2016/681 
Directive regulates the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data in the EU for the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. It obliges airlines 
to hand national authorities passengers’ data for all flights from third countries to the EU and 
vice versa, but Member States can also extend it to ‘intra-EU’ ones (i.e. from an EU country to 
one or more other EU countries), provided that they notify the EU Commission. Thus, PNR Di-
rective affects all passengers who arrive in the territory of one Member State originating from 
a third country, or who depart from a Member State’s territory to a non-EU country, including 
any transfer or transit flights. Using PNR data, the individual is profiled and encoded in terms 
of degrees of risk.
Keywords: PNR data; passenger; profiling; mass surveillance; pre-determined criteria; risk as-
sessment

